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David Cameron’s argument will fool no-one, and will relegate
the existing EU-UK relationship to the periphery.
Blog Admin
Julian Priestley takes an in-depth look at David Cameron’s speech on the UK’s
relationship with Europe. He finds that that it fell into familiar Eurosceptic fallacies about the
EU, ignored linkages between regulation and the internal market, and overestimated the
UK’s chances of renegotiating the relationship with the EU. Instead, he writes, this morning’s
speech was solely designed to shore up Cameron’s own position in the Conservative party
and to counter UKIP’s increasing anti-EU rhetoric.
There are various kinds of  polit ical speeches. There is the call to arms to enthuse and
inspire one’s audience. There is the speech to sway the audience, to persuade listeners, maybe even to
change minds. There is the speech to clear the air, set out a new direction, and lay down a course of
action. And then there is David Cameron’s long-awaited and much postponed speech on the UK’s
relations with Europe.
It was a moment calling f or some passion like those at the height of  the debate over Europe in the 60s
and 70s, and Britain’s European f uture deserved better than the mediocrity of  the argument and the
banality of  the conclusion which was on of f er today.
Af ter the obligatory reverences to Europe’s past, the speech
f ell back on the f amiliar eurosceptical f allacies. The EU is
portrayed as a kind of  land-bound leviathan which has taken
on a lif e of  its own. A number of  very basic f acts are ignored;
the global f inancial crisis has created a problem of  public debt
which is hitt ing euroland and non-euroland countries, and
which both categories are struggling to overcome; the UK is
not some oasis of  rampant prosperity and competit ive
excellence only held back by EU regulations, its economy is
underperf orming compared with the majority of  EU  member
states which have adopted the euro; the crisis has
demonstrated glaring weaknesses in the governance of  the
euro but belatedly and painf ully decisions are being taken to
address the design f aults; despite all the gleef ul f orecasts,
the announcement of  the imminent death of  the euro seems
premature; yes, of  course the UK should be looking to
increase its trade with the rest of  the world but is it seriously
imagined that the intraeuropean trade will be anything less
than crucial to the UK economy f or any f oreseeable f uture?;
and, as to the democratic argument, all signif icant EU
decisions are taken not by bureaucratic conspiracy but by a
majority of  democratically elected governments accountable to
national MPs and by a majority of  democratically elected MEPs. Even this UK government f inds itself  in
the majority in Council on a majority of  issues where votes are taken, and most decisions are still made
by consensus.
As to the euro crisis itself , Cameron is right to say that there will be changes in euro governance but that
does not amount to a case f or redef ining theUK’s relationship with the EU. For what the Prime Minister
appears to be proposing is, on the one hand, to encourage the euro countries and the euro aspirant
countries to strengthen the common institutions in a f iscal and ult imately polit ical union, while in a kind of
backwards shimmying, relegating the existing EU-UK relationship to the periphery.
This is a startling reversal of  f orty years of  Brit ish policy on the European Union. Until now, at every
stage, at every juncture and under every government the aim has always been to place Britain at the
centre of  developments to inf luence the outcome. Where opt-outs have been judged necessary they
used always to be sought in the thick of  negotiations and, with customary f inesse, only af ter banking as
many concessions to theUKline as possible. Taking the UK to the periphery at the outset is a negotiating
tactic which was used at the Messina Conf erence in 1955, and then f if ty-six years later with the veto of
the ‘Fiscal Compact’; it  took two decades to recover inf luence af ter the diplomatic blunder in Sicily; the
Fiscal Compact f iasco seems likely to be the f irst of  many unf orced errors in the modern era.
The Prime Minister ’s speech is of  course only the curtain-raiser f or a drama in many acts. As he
reminded us there is already underway a cross-Whitehall technical review of  EU competencies and their
impact on the UK which will take us to the end of  the year. Bef ore the next general election the
government will seek to ‘def end Brit ish interests’ and particular those of  the City of  London in
negotiations on banking union; in other words business as usual. But even here the negotiating clout of
UK ministers and of f icials will not have boosted by sowing doubt about the UK’s long-term European
f uture. Why should other member states, already exasperated with the strident negativism of  London,
make concessions to one of  their number which has already made it clear that its presence at the top
table may only be of  limited duration?
Af ter the election, should the Conservatives win a clear majority, the government would then present a
catalogue of  demands f or powers to be repatriated. A caref ul reading of  the Cameron speech would lead
to the conclusion that the speaker understands that a general treaty revision with a stronger place f or
subsidiarity, ‘rolling back the f rontiers of  the state’, ‘getting Brussels to concentrate on essentials’,
‘lighter touch regulation’ is not realistically on of f er; and that the pragmatic aims would be a series of
special concessions and new opt-outs specif ically f or Britain.
Understandably perhaps the Prime Minister did not burden his speech with specif ics about which
currently exclusive EU competences would be repatriated to the UK; f isheries policy perhaps although it
would be dif f icult to envisage how to curb over- f ishing of  the North Sea without a ref ormed and
strengthened common policy; how about regional policy, ironically launched in the 1970s at the insistence
of  the UK, and where an opt-out could create the paradox of  Brit ish taxpayers contributing to the
f inancing of  regional development projects in all regions except their own? Social, health and saf ety and
environmental policies? This of  course is at the heart of  concerns in the UK that uniquely our
businesses are f ettered by excessive regulation although the same rules do not seem to hold back
German or Finnish or Swedish competit iveness. More importantly, the UK government does not seem to
have realised that these accursed rules are in f act part and parcel of  the internal market which is the one
element of  the EU which most in the government seem to wish to preserve. In f act the internal market
has always been a compromise; a competit ive open market with f ree movement of  goods and services
but within an economic area of  high environmental and social standards to reduce the danger of  social
dumping within the Union.
That attachment to a balanced approach to the single market makes it unlikely that most other member
states would look with f avour on one member state staying in the internal market but opting opt of  all
the provisions which guarantee that the unicity of  the market does not become an excuse f or the
systematic undermining of  social and environmental standards.
The Prime Minister would seem to reply that the reluctance of  others to open negotiations on Brit ish
demands will be overcome by the necessity to make concessions in return f or Brit ish cooperation at the
big ticket event which will be the intergovernmental conf erence on f iscal union. Compared with what is at
stake in drawing up a blueprint f or economic and polit ical union in Europe, the side order of  Brit ish
demands can be slipped in almost unnoticed.
Two words of  caution are needed here. As at present there is no IGC planned f or 2015 or even f or later.
While some in the institutions and in Mrs Merkel’s party seem keen on a new constitutional process, the
prospect is viewed with horror in other capitals. There is not even the beginning of  a consensus on the
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overall f ramework of  a new Treaty let alone any optimism about the outcome of  the process or indeed
its ratif ication. And by its cussed reaction to the Fiscal Pact a year ago, the Brit ish have taught the old
dog some new tricks; you can do a lot outside an EU treaty, and you can by-pass even the most
recalcitrant member state.
But even if  we suppose governments would be ready to bite the bullet, these treaties can take their t ime.
Between the Laeken declaration which dreamed up the possibility of  a constitutional treaty and the actual
entry into f orce of  the Lisbon Treaty which was its ult imate outcome, a f ull decade elapsed. There is no
reason to suppose that a Fiscal Union treaty process with or without throwing into the mix some extra
UK opt outs would be more speedily or smoothly completed in order to conf orm to Mr Cameron’s
artif icial t imetable.
Hence the last arrow in Mr Cameron’s quiver is the blithe assumption that the 27 will swallow their
reservations and make concessions so that Britain can stay in the Union. This is pure Micawberism. You
hear all over Brussels the expressions of  regret about a UK exit but more with resignation than any
determination to resist. Even our tradit ional f riends to the East and to the North do not carry their
af f ection f or the UK to the point of  countenancing what many would see as the unravelling of  the single
market and the acquis communautaire. Britain lost points over the f iscal compact f arrago and irritated
eurozone countries with lectures about what was needed without lif t ing a f inger to help. Now when it
comes to vetoes it uses the tactic of  ‘shoot f irst, ask questions later ’ even when, as over budgetary
matters, it is not short of  allies.
In the area where its contribution was expected
to be the greatest-  the common external policy-
where the Prime Minister himself  talked of  the
hef t the UK brings to these questions and where
one of  its nationals is the policy supremo, Britain
drags its f eet and engages in pettif ogging turf
wars which many see as a thinly disguised
attempt to undermine the Union’s capacity to act
as one. So gradually the notion begins to take
hold that Britain is indeed drif t ing to the exit, but
that the loss could be borne with all due grieving.
What is clear is that not one single member state
has expressed support f or the UK posit ion,
welcomed the reopening of  the relationship, or
indicated willingness to back the repatriation of
powers being sought.
So the best that the UK could hope f or would be
the kind of  f ace-saving ‘renegotiation’ that the
1974 Labour government sought af ter it had
rejected Mr Heath’s terms f or entry the year
bef ore. But things have moved on. The deal in
1974 was not a new settlement, not even a Treaty change, just some cosmetic adjustments to policy. And
in contrast to today, the terms were not central to the debate or subjected to serious scrutiny.
So there is no evidence that the Cameron scenario- a renegotiation of  the whole relationship as a
prelude f or a ref erendum to renew public consent-  could enjoy even the most limited success.
Of  the ref erendum itself , it  is worth pointing out that even were our partners against all odds to accede
to UK demands, grant a changed basis f or membership with our engagement limited to a narrowed down
more market based deregulated internal market, and with special protections f or the City of  London
secured, the procedure proposed by the Prime Minister is f lawed.
If  successf ul the question would be along the lines of , ‘the government has negotiated changes to
Britain’s membership of  the EU, do you consent to this new relationship etc?’ It would indeed be
according to the Prime Minister an ‘in/out ref erendum’. Many eurosceptics would vote yes, and others
strongly opposed to the EU, would vote no. But what of  those who support the UK’s continued
membership on the existing terms, who might even support the UK playing a stronger role in EU af f airs
and who in  any case would oppose the ‘terms’ renegotiated by a f uture Tory government particularly if
our participation in social and environmental policy had been ef f ectively resiled? Some would swallow
their reservations and vote to stay in, many others would not. Mr Cameron says that ‘in/out’ ref erendum
now would not be appropriate but his ref erendum at the end of  2017 would ef f ectively disenf ranchise
that signif icant section of  public opinion which wants a self -conf ident UK to be part of  a successf ul EU.
And just possibly a ref erendum midterm in a hypothetical second Cameron government might not be the
highpoint of  the ruling party’s domestic authority.
The Prime Minister at the end of  his speech made a rather strong case f or Britain staying in the EU. But
in questions af terwards he ref used to be drawn on whether if  the ‘renegotiations’ f ailed he would vote to
stay in.  Others in his party, the Mayor of  London, the Chancellor and other ministers state a pref erence
f or staying in the EU, but downplay the drama of  exit which just a f ew months ago Cameron described as
‘mad’. This is again a curious negotiating tactic; we ask you to go through all the pain and bother of  a
treaty change so that you can have the privilege of  keeping us in the club, but we don’t care all that much
about the outcome.
It ref lects a view that has gained currency in the upper reaches of  the Tory party. You hear it said that we
will get good terms on the outside because they need us more than we need them, because their trade
surplus with us is so huge (in itself  not a negligible recognition of  our long-term trading prospects). This
is of  course whistling in the wind: as Mr Cameron himself  admitted, Britain absent f rom the central
economic decisions of  the EU (and here already nearly half way out the door) will lose any say in the
f uture development of  the internal market, in determining the trade negotiating mandates with our main
partners, and will be in no posit ion to shore up the interests of  the City. And at a polit ical level, single-
handedly the UK will have dealt those member states with a very dif f erent vision of  the EU’s f uture, the
strongest cards.
Despite the customary slickness in presentation, the speech will f ool no-one. What is at stake here is
very straightf orward. Mr Cameron’s speech and this cynical apology f or a European policy appear to
many as solely designed to shore up his personal posit ion as party leader and prevent UKIP f rom
siphoning of f  votes which could guarantee the return of  his party to the opposition benches. But so
amateurishly blatant has been the manoeuvre that our partners abroad, the international business and
f inance community, the Brit ish voters and even the eurosceptics in his own party will see through it all.
Courage in polit ics is an undervalued quality. This very week an act of  courage was commemorated; a
Treaty of  reconciliation signed by a German Chancellor and a French president f if ty years ago. Some of
Mr Cameron’s own predecessors possessed courage in spades and took on the world. But we now have
a Prime Minister who allows himself  to be ratt led by Mr Nigel Farage and his pinstriped army.
The attention now turns to the leadership of  the other mainstream parties, and particularly the
leadership of  the Opposition, to see if  they can summon up resolve in the pursuit of  the genuine national
interest, and articulate a vision of  Europe which transcends the mediocre calculation of  short- term party
advantage.
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